While the concept of the ‘hybrid regime’ traces its origins back to 1970, it was formally solidified in modern political science during the 1990s as a scholarly response to the ‘Third Wave of Democratisation’.
This global surge of democratic transitions was part of a framework postulated by the political scientist Samuel P. Huntington. He categorised the global spread of democracy into three distinct historical periods: an initial wave beginning in the mid-1800s that stalled due to the rising tide of authoritarianism in the 1920s/30s; a second wave triggered by the end of World War II and lasting till the early 1960s; and a third wave beginning in the 1990s but one that prompted the hybrid classification, because many transitioning states remained suspended in a grey zone between full democracy and autocracy.
By the mid-2000s, a democratic recession marked by significant backsliding became evident, as many emerging democracies failed to consolidate and, instead, adopted hybrid models. While Western scholars often interpret this as a symptom of decline, an alternative perspective suggests the model acts as a vital deterrence against outright authoritarianism.
In Pakistan, the hybrid model’s legacy dates back to the late 1950s, when Gen Ayub Khan abrogated the Constitution and imposed the country’s first martial law. Gen Ayub transitioned from overt martial law to a ‘controlled democracy’ in 1962. Cornered by a powerful pro-democracy movement, Ayub was forced to resign in 1969, even though, the fact is, he only really did so after losing the institutional backing of his own institution — the military. As Stephen Cohen notes, this period deeply embedded militarism into Pakistan’s political fabric.
Pakistan’s hybrid regime has hardened into a lasting political order, where political parties and civilian leaders exist within carefully managed limits
Following the end of Gen Ziaul Haq’s military rule in 1988, this militarism evolved from direct intervention towards informal systemic control. This strategy was then refined after the 2008 collapse of Gen Pervez Musharraf’s military regime. The military establishment (ME) started to seek compatible civilian partners to formulate a sturdy hybrid system.
However, the refined model faced immediate challenges in the form of a struggling economy, Islamist militancy, and the resurgence of the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) and the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N). These two had a history of strained relations with the ME. After the 2008 elections, these parties successfully ousted Gen Musharraf, leading to heightened civil-military tensions.
Consequently, by 2010, the ME began cultivating Imran Khan as a ‘third alternative’, designed to be the centrepiece of a more manageable hybrid arrangement. Despite the PML-N’s landslide victory in 2013, the ME bolstered Khan’s populist street agitation by aligning the judiciary, media and wealthy donors behind his ‘cause’. The objective was to neutralise the PPP and PML-N with a ‘popular’ civilian frontman who would be easier to manage. This project reached its zenith in 2018, when Khan became prime minister.
But the project quickly unravelled, due to Khan’s lack of administrative experience and his inability to transition out of movement mode and mindset. He eventually became so enamoured with the state-sponsored narrative of his own popularity that he viewed himself as indestructible, even as governance declined. He began being seen as a liability by the ME, before being ousted in 2022 through an act of parliament.
So why did the ME persist with the hybrid model after the collapse of the Khan regime?
For the new ME leadership under Gen Asim Munir, the failure was one of personnel, not policy. The consensus seemed to be that many of Khan’s backers in the ME had been seduced by his populist appeal, neglecting the practicalities of governance and international relations. In the eyes of the new ME, the model was sound but had been poorly implemented by a civilian agent and his handlers, who were unable to manage the complexities of power.
Refining its approach, the new ME sought to recalibrate the hybrid model. It is likely that, by examining ‘successful’ hybrid systems in countries such as Turkey, Egypt, Indonesia and Russia, the ME opted to repair its fractured relationships with PML-N and the PPP. The goal was to replace the volatile populism of the previous hybrid model with a more pragmatic outlook, and action.
Due to their inherent adaptability, the durability of ‘successful’ hybrid regimes often surpasses that of rigid authoritarianism. By maintaining a degree of institutional flexibility, such as permitting elections or limited press freedom, hybrid regimes allow social frustrations to be vented without jeopardising their core authority.
Furthermore, the inclusion of opposition parties within parliamentary structures serves as a strategic tool for co-optation, effectively neutralising dissent by integrating potential dissenters into the state framework. Iranian political scientist Vida Yaghouti argues that, by incorporating elements of democratic participation, hybrid regimes diffuse social friction and effectively manage violent uprisings against the regime.
This strategic flexibility is bolstered by the preservation of established bureaucratic and security apparatuses, which function as stabilising anchors during bouts of economic instability or civil unrest. The centralisation of executive and legislative authority in hybrid regimes enables rapid policy formulation. By bypassing the deliberative processes inherent in traditional democracies, hybrid regimes can enact legislation and address national emergencies with greater expediency.
By projecting an image of institutional stability and decisive strength, hybrid regimes often present a more compelling profile to international partners than either dictatorships or fledgling, volatile democracies. Advocates of the hybrid model argue that, amidst global democratic backsliding and geopolitical instability, this model is indispensable for navigating complex transitions and sustaining fragile power balances between political and economic elites.
However, there is a counter-argument that posits that the hybrid model is no longer merely transitional. Far from a ‘stop-gap’, intended to guide fledgling democracies toward maturity, the model appears to be solidifying. As international and domestic pressures intensify, the hybrid regime is increasingly becoming a permanent, hardened fixture of the political landscape.
In the contemporary Pakistani landscape, the hybrid model has solidified into an entrenched, centrist-pragmatic and anti-populist apparatus. Within this framework, the ME functions as the primary engine, while civilian leaders are integrated based on their alignment with the system’s strategic goals.
Given current political and economic trajectories, this arrangement is poised to remain the country’s dominant political reality for the foreseeable future.
Published in Dawn, EOS, December 28th, 2025
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