For much of the past decade, Pakistan had been strategically adrift — crippled by economic mismanagement, plagued by political instability, and viewed by allies and partners as a state whose problems needed to be managed lest they create wider instability. Simply put, we were broadly seen as the sick man of South Asia.
By the time 2025 rolled in, the country‘s polycrisis was still raging. But fast forward a few months, and the year’s outlook shifted to one of opportunities, with an emerging geopolitical reality in the region.
Much like historical geopolitical openings that have come Pakistan’s way, this moment also arose from a confluence of regional shocks and strategic recalculations that reshaped how power and security are being reassessed around the world, particularly in West Asia and the Middle East.
A unique window
Two developments in particular created a unique window for Pakistan: the first was the Trump administration’s post-ceasefire plan for Gaza. Despite being contested over its details, the initiative compelled regional actors to confront an uncomfortable truth: the United States was prepared to underwrite a new regional security and political architecture that would require regional powers to take greater ownership of their own security needs.
Washington’s strategic evolution — or retreat, as referred to by some — is not unique to the Middle East; from Europe to East Asia, the Trump administration wants its allies and partners to take greater ownership of their own security.
The second and more consequential event occurred when Israel’s increasingly belligerent actions culminated in Tel Aviv’s strikes on Doha. This served as an inflexion point for Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia, and underscored a hard reality: advanced air defences, American guarantees, and quiet normalisation channels will not be enough to secure these countries against an increasingly radical and belligerent Israel. In addition, the United States, despite being Israel’s patron, would do very little to stop rogue Israeli actions.
In that environment, regional actors began to look anew at who could actually deliver kinetic capability at scale, under pressure, and without collapsing politically or operationally. And this is where Pakistan entered the scene.
This opening, however, would not have materialised without Pakistan’s military performance against India in a short but intense conflict earlier in the year. Widely written off as overstretched and hollowed out by years of economic and political crises, Pakistan demonstrated that it retained a credible, modern, and integrated conventional war-fighting capability. Its air force, in particular, showcased operational proficiency and command-and-control sophistication that surprised foreign observers.
The signal was not lost in the Middle East. Pakistan showed that it could do something no regional military other than Israel has consistently demonstrated: deliver calibrated, high-end kinetic force without losing control of its skies. That performance reframed Pakistan from being a problematic country to one that could become a potential regional security provider. In addition, Islamabad’s successes showcased that when paired with effective training and doctrine, Chinese weapons platforms could outperform next-gen Western systems.
Without this demonstration, the Strategic Defence and Mutual Assistance agreement with Saudi Arabia would simply not have been possible. The pact formalised what had long been implicit, marking a significant shift in the regional scales of power.
All of a sudden, now, Pakistan, long viewed through the lens of instability, emerged as a country that could be a net security provider to the region. All of this does not mean that Pakistan’s very real problems have magically disappeared; 2026 will be a year that will put the country to the test, and to capitalise on this geopolitical moment, Pakistan will need to put in a lot of hard yards, many of them at home.
What next?
For one, a resurgent insurgency, fuelled by militant sanctuaries across the Afghan border, continues to sap state capacity and public confidence. Without sustained pressure and a coherent strategy toward Kabul, Pakistan risks being strategically overextended even as it seeks a larger regional role.
At the same time, tensions with India remain acute, with dialogue effectively frozen. In the absence of bilateral engagement, crisis management will increasingly rely on third parties — most notably Washington and Riyadh — to prevent escalation and preserve deterrence stability. That may be workable in the short term, but it is not a substitute for a longer-term framework to manage rivalry. At some point, Islamabad and Delhi will have to sit across the table, but until then, Pakistan should seek to ensure that the ceasefire at the Line of Control holds.
Managing these two borders should be the top priority.
Regionally, Pakistan’s involvement in the post-Gaza political process will also require careful calibration. Coordination with Arab partners and Turkiye will be essential, as will managing domestic spoilers who may see regional engagement as an ideological compromise.
The core strategy here should be to let Saudi Arabia, Turkiye, and other Arab states take the lead; these countries have a far bigger stake in the future of Gaza and Palestine, and Pakistan’s approach should be to be seen as being supportive of their efforts. The margin for error is thin; missteps could quickly erode the credibility Islamabad has only just regained.
Finally, none of this will matter if economic stabilisation falters. The hard-won gains of recent months have only delivered economic stability; sustainable growth remains a distant dream. Building momentum will require sticking to economic reforms; the successful privatisation of the Pakistan International Airlines makes one confident that momentum will be built up in the coming weeks.
Energy sector reforms should be the next big priority, and the singular focus should be to grow the competitiveness of Pakistani exports of both goods and services.
The silver lining
The glimmer of hope here is that there is a clear recognition in Islamabad and Rawalpindi that geopolitical relevance cannot be sustained without a robust and modern economic base.
A country that could end up on the verge of external default within weeks can never be seen as a stable actor, let alone a net security provider to a region as complex as the Middle East. Whether this recognition turns into momentum that can be sustained for the next few years remains to be seen, but 2026 will be a litmus test for those — at home and abroad — who have backed the current ruling dispensation.
After years of strategic drift, 2025 has placed Pakistan in a rare geopolitical sweet spot where its allies and partners, including the United States, Saudi Arabia, Turkiye, and China, see it as a country that offers them things they value and need.
Whether 2026 becomes the year Pakistan converts that moment into a durable influence will depend on statecraft, discipline, and follow-through.
from Dawn - Home https://ift.tt/026jtXW
via IFTTT
0 Comments